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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2640 
___________ 
 
BOB AARON MIKELL,  
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN MONICA RECKTENWALD; ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-13-cv-00189) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 26, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed:  October 15, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Bob Mikell appeals the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania’s order dismissing his habeas petition filed under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
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we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to its factual findings.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 
F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Mikell is a prisoner currently incarcerated at FCI-Allenwood.  In September 2007, 
he pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia 
to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine 
and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  See S.D. Ga. Cr. A. No. 06-0026-10.  
On January 8, 2008, he was sentenced to 132 months’ imprisonment.  Mikell was 
sentenced as a career offender, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a), a 
classification that was based on two prior Georgia state convictions — one for the sale of 
cocaine, and one for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.  Mikell appealed 
his criminal judgment to the Eleventh Circuit, and that Court affirmed.  See United States 
v. Mikell, 284 F. App’x 707 (11th Cir. 2008).   
 In February 2010, Mikell filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his 
counsel had been ineffective, that he had not entered his guilty plea knowingly and 
intelligently, and that his state convictions were invalid and should not have been used to 
calculate his federal sentence.  See S.D. Ga. Civ. A. No. 09-0065.  In January 2011, a 
magistrate judge recommended that Mikell’s motion be denied on the merits, and on 
March 3, 2011, the District Court approved and adopted the magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation.  The Eleventh Circuit then denied Mikell’s motion for a certificate of 
appealability.   
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 After other filings not relevant here, on January 25, 2013, Mikell filed a petition 
for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.  He claimed that he was “actually innocent of being a[] 
Career Offender” based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010),
1
 and because he did not actually commit the state crimes 
that underlie his career-offender status.  The District Court dismissed Mikell’s petition, 
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the petition because the claims could be 
raised in only a § 2255 motion.  Mikell then filed a timely notice of appeal.   
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  “Motions pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge 
their convictions or sentences[.]”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002).  However, a federal prisoner can seek relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if the remedy 
provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his or 
her detention.  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.  This occurs “only where the petitioner 
demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 
                                              
1
 In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Supreme Court considered whether a Texas state drug 
offense for simple possession qualified under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
as an “aggravated felony.”  130 S. Ct. at 2580.  In general, a state drug conviction 
constitutes an aggravated felony if the offense of conviction is analogous to a felony 
under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).  See id. at 2581-82.  In Carachuri-
Rosendo, the Court noted that, under the CSA, with certain irrelevant exceptions, simple 
possession is punishable as a felony only when the defendant has a previous drug 
conviction.  Id. at 2581.  The Supreme Court held that “when a defendant has been 
convicted of a simple possession offense that has not been enhanced based on the fact of 
a prior conviction, he has not been convicted under [the INA] of a felony punishable as 
such under the Controlled Substances Act.”  Id. at 2589 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his . . . claims.”  Id. at 
538.  This exception is extremely narrow and applies in only rare circumstances.  In In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997), we recognized that the exception could 
apply where an intervening change in the law decriminalized the conduct for which the 
petitioner had been convicted.  
 Mikell asserts that he is innocent of being a career offender, and that, therefore, his 
claim is properly brought under § 2241.  There are several problems with Mikell’s 
position — for instance, it is not clear how Carachuri-Rosendo actually supports his 
cause, and he could have raised the arguments that he raises now in his § 2255 motion — 
However, the simplest reason for denying the relief under § 2241 is that Dorsainvil 
allows relief under § 2241 only when a subsequent statutory interpretation renders a 
petitioner’s conduct no longer criminal.  Id. at 251-52.  Mikell makes no allegation that 
he is actually innocent of the drug crime for which he was convicted; he asserts only that 
his sentence was improper.  The Dorsainvil exception is therefore inapplicable, and relief 
under § 2241 is not available.  See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (holding that a petitioner 
could not proceed under § 2241 because his argument was based on Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which “dealt with sentencing and did not render conspiracy 
to import heroin, the crime for which Okereke was convicted, not criminal”). 
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no substantial question,” 
and will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
 
